A major provision of the Affordable Care Act was the creation of Health Insurance Marketplaces, which began operating for the 2014 plan year. Although enrollment initially grew in these markets, enrollment has fallen recently amid insurer exits and rising premiums. To better understand these markets, we estimate premium elasticity of demand for Marketplace plans, using within-plan premium changes from 2014 to 2015, accounting for state-specific trends and simultaneous changes in generosity. Our preferred estimate implies that a one percent premium increase reduces plan-specific enrollment by 1.7 percent. We argue that this high elasticity reflects the rapid growth and high churn in this market, as well as the high degree of standardization and the availability of many close substitutes.
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A major provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was the creation of Health Insurance Marketplaces, online portals for individual, private health insurance that began operating for the 2014 plan year. The Marketplaces differ from other insurance markets because they display through a single portal all products from all insurers offering Qualified Health Plans, with standardized information on premiums and benefits. Marketplace enrollment totaled eight million customers in 2014, and rose to 11.7 million in 2015 and 12.7 million in 2016. In 2017, enrollment fell to 12.2 million as premiums rose dramatically, and several insurers exited, leaving many markets with limited competition. 11 These changes have been central political and policy issues in the United States.
We estimate the premium elasticity of demand for Marketplace plans using newly available data on enrollment and premiums. This elasticity is important for understanding recent changes in the Marketplaces, and for improving our understanding of consumer price sensitivity in the individual coverage market. High elasticities imply low optimal premiums, but they may make it difficult for firms to recover their fixed costs, and could thus lead to firm exit. Using a within-plan identification strategy to account for unobserved plan quality, we estimate that a 1 percent increase in the premium net of any tax credits lowers demand by 1.7%, higher than previously estimated demand elasticities for health insurance. We argue that this high elasticity reflects rapid growth and high churn in this market, as well as the high degree of standardization and the availability of many close substitutes.
Most prior ACA research has shown only indirect evidence on premium sensitivity. For example, consumers choose low premium plans (Gabel et al., 2017) ; informational nudges about potential savings from switching plans make consumers more likely to make an active choice 
I. Background on the Health Insurance Marketplaces
Under the ACA, insurers must charge the same premium to all customers, regardless of health status. However, premiums vary by age, by tobacco use status, and by geographic rating areas (GRAs, typically clusters of counties). Insurers may offer plans in all counties in a state, or only in a subset. The ACA standardizes plans by requiring that they must cover a consistent set of benefits, with limits on annual out-of-pocket maxima, and no limit on lifetime benefits. The
Marketplace further standardizes the display of benefit information: plans are categorized into four metal tiers of increasing generosity based on actuarial value: bronze, silver, gold, and platinum. A "catastrophic" plan is also available to younger persons. The Marketplace interface highlights metal level, plan deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and premiums.
The ACA created two types of subsidies for health care: the premium tax credit (PTC) and cost-sharing reduction (CSR) subsidies. The PTC is a subsidy to make insurance affordable, an important consideration because the ACA also included a mandate to buy insurance, with a tax penalty for non-compliance. The amount of the credit depends on household income and on the premium of the benchmark silver plan in that household's county; it does not depend on which plan the consumer eventually chooses. Thus, PTCs do not affect plan choice because they 4 do not affect plans' relative premiums; the PTC only affects whether consumers purchase any coverage at all. The CSR subsidy reduces copayments and deductibles for households below 250 percent of the Federal Poverty Level, but only for those choosing silver plans. The Marketplace displays customer-specific premiums and cost-sharing information that reflect these subsidies.
II. Data
We use recently released data on plan enrollment in 2014 and 2015 from the Center for 
III. Econometric model
We adopt a discrete choice logit demand framework. We let index enrollees, plans, and markets, which we think of as a state-year. We let be the set of plans available in market . Plan = 0 indicates the outside option of no coverage or off-exchange coverage.
The conditional indirect utility to enrollee from plan in market is
where is premium sensitivity, is the gross premium of plan and is the tax credit available to person in market (which does not vary across plans). 3 Observed product characteristics include dummy variables for deductible levels, state-metal level fixed effects, and, in some specifications insurer-year-metal level fixed effects. The term represents unobserved quality. It includes provider network characteristics and unmeasured aspects of costsharing, including eligibility for CSR subsidies if is a silver plan.
The conditional indirect utility from non-insurance purchase is
where 0 is a person-specific value of having any insurance coverage, and is the mandate penalty associated with non-purchase of insurance. This specification allows for arbitrary heterogeneity in the value of having coverage (-0 ).
We renormalize utility by subtracting from all options. 0 and become
We set the base price equal to the age 30 price. Prices vary by age, but by a constant factor across plans (so the ratio of prices between plans is the same, regardless of age). Rescaling prices for the age curve would not affect our elasticity estimate, which is already scaled by price. For more details on these tax credits, see CBPP (2017).
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Mean utility from choosing plan ( ≠ 0), , no longer depends on . These equations also make clear that the PTC affects insurance demand by reducing the relative utility of noncoverage, rather than shifting the value of one plan relative to another.
We assume that is distributed type-1 extreme value. The probability of purchasing plan is
This probability is not specific, so we can aggregate over enrollees to obtain observed market
, where is enrollment in plan as a share of all eligible in market .
Simplifying, we have
Our goal is to estimate premium sensitivity and calculate own premium elasticities. We calculate the premium elasticity two ways: with respect to the gross price, and with respect to the price net of the PTC. The gross price elasticity for plan in year is simply = − (1 − ). This elasticity is relevant for insurers as it determines how their revenue changes when their price changes. The net price elasticity, however, elasticity reflects consumer behavior, and is most comparable to past estimates. The net price elasticity, ̃, can be found as ̃= , where is the ratio of the net price to the gross price for plan j in year t. We do not estimate equation (1) directly because it is likely that premiums and quality are highly correlated. To address this correlation, we assume a fixed effects structure: = +
. We expect that is highly correlated with permanent aspects of quality , but not necessarily correlated with the innovation in quality ̃. This is because many aspects of quality-network, cost sharing, and insurer brand-vary little over time. To deal with the fixed effect, we estimate a differenced version of equation (1):
We estimate this equation via ordinary least squares, with increasingly stringent controls included in Δ . We always include state fixed effects; in some specifications, we include fixed effects for state-by-metal level, insurer, or insurer-by-metal level, as well as controls for changes in quality. Our identification assumption is that within-plan premium changes from 2014 to 2015
are uncorrelated with plan-specific changes in quality, Δ . Other changes common to all plans within a state, such as changing Medicaid coverage or healthcare.gov functionality, are captured by the state fixed effect. The most likely threat to our identification assumption is changes in generosity, which we address by controlling for changes in deductible level (measured as in
Ericson (2014)), a proxy for more general generosity measures. Our identification strategy is similar to Curto et al. (2015) , who use plan fixed effects to control for premium-quality correlation. Table 2 reports our estimates of premium sensitivity, as well as the elasticity of demand, based on Equation (2). We begin in column (1) with state fixed effects, and add richer fixed effects and controls in subsequent columns. Our preferred estimate, in column (3), controls for 8 state-metal level fixed effects and changes in plan deductible. The elasticity with respect to the gross premium is 4.59 (P<0.001). As the subsidies cover, on average, about 60% of the premium, the elasticity with respect to the net premium is about 60% smaller, 1.70. In the remaining columns, we control for insurer-state and insurer-state-metal level fixed effects, which adjust for insurer-specific changes in networks and advertising. These extra controls do not reduce premium sensitivity, but they reduce precision. Thus, our preferred specification includes statemetal level fixed effects and deductible controls.
IV. Results
Although our elasticity estimate relies on a parametric model of demand and a withinplan identification strategy, several factors suggest that the estimate is not driven by these assumptions. First, Figure 1 shows the basic variation underlying our results. It is clear that premium changes and enrollment changes are highly negatively correlated; this finding is independent of any functional form for demand. Furthermore, in Table 3 we show that our results are robust to non-logit specifications, in which we simply regress changes in log enrollment or changes in log market shares on changes in log premiums and controls.
It is also unlikely that our identification approach-from within-plan premium changes-drives our high premium elasticity estimates. Plausible failures of our identification assumption imply that our premium elasticity is too small, not too large. For example, it is possible that unobserved aspects of generosity change with premiums. However, this would result in a bias towards zero, as we expect a positive correlation between generosity changes and premium changes.
V. Discussion
Our estimated elasticity of demand with respect to the premium net of subsidies, 1.70, is particularly large relative to estimated net price elasticities for employer-sponsored plans, which range from 0.2 to 0.8. (Abraham, Vogt, & Gaynor, 2006; Bundorf, Levin, & Mahoney, 2012; 9 Curto, Einav, Levin, & Bhattacharya, 2015; Cutler & Reber, 1998; Einav, Finkelstein, & Cullen, 2010; Royalty & Solomon, 1999) ; it is also larger than the elasticity of 1.15 that Curto et al. have estimated for Medicare Advantage plans (Curto et al. 2015) . Two unusual features of the Marketplaces likely generate this high elasticity. First, Marketplaces have an unusually large number of active choosers, both because of rapid market growth from 2014 to 2015, and because of high "churn" from people entering and exiting the Marketplaces, due to job transitions, new discovery of the market, or changing Medicaid eligibility. Active choice is important because past literature has documented substantial inertia in insurance plan choice, leading to low premium elasticities (Ericson, 2014; Handel, 2013) . Indeed, when Royalty & Solomon (1999) estimate elasticities among switchers-who make active choices, in a context with standardized plans-they find high elasticities, comparable to ours.
Second, Marketplaces contain standardized plans, including many close substitutes. For example, the median county in 2015 had 41 Marketplace plans, including 15 silver plans.
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Premium elasticities are likely to be larger when many close substitutes are available. The design of the Marketplaces themselves, with their standardized presentation of premiums and benefits, may also raise elasticities (Schmitz & Ziebarth, 2017) . 6 The Medicare Part D market also involves standardized presentations, and past research has found large elasticities (between 5 and 6, larger even than those found here) for these plans which are also sold through a centralized portal (Decarolis, Polyakova, & Ryan, 2015; Lucarelli, Prince, & Simon, 2012) .
These results are relevant also for understanding Marketplace performance under possible ACA replacement plans. Both the American Health Care Act the Better Care Reconciliation Act 10 (the House and Senate replacement plans) preserve the Marketplaces as centralized markets for purchasing insurance. The high elasticity we document suggests that, on the one hand, competition can be an effective tool for reducing premiums but, on the other hand, insurers may find it difficult to turn a profit, and limited entry may be a concern in the absence of subsidies.
These results raise several questions for future research. First, it would be valuable to know which of the many unusual features of the Marketplaces-growth, churn, product standardization, and display standardization-drive high premium elasticities. Second, how desirable is standardization, particularly if it leads to high sensitivity to the transparent features of the plan? The current display highlights premiums and cost-sharing information. When information on some dimensions are made easier to find, consumers may feel less incentive to find information on other features, for example because there is a fixed cost of acquiring any amount of product information. Although display standardization of premiums may reduce the likelihood that customers choose overly expensive or even dominated plans (as in Bhargava et al. (2015) ), it also may encourage consumers to focus too much on premiums and cost sharing, and ignore other relevant but non-salient product characteristics like network composition or prescription drug formularies.
13 (2)- (4) we regress the change in log size on the change in log price, as well as the controls; we interpret the price coefficient as the elasticity. We consider alternative measures of size. In column (2), we treat size as enrollment; in column (3) we treat size as market share (enrollment divided by total eligibility); in column (4) 
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